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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge: 
 
Resorts International, Inc., now Sun International North 
America, Inc., ("Resorts") appeals a District Court order 
reversing a Bankruptcy Court order that awarded Resorts 
full restitution for losses resulting from a stock transaction. 
The Bankruptcy Court found for Resorts on the alternative 
grounds of mistake and fraud. We will affirm the District 
Court's reversal. 
 
I. 
 
The relevant facts are generally undisputed and we need 
only summarize. Fred Lowenschuss was a shareholder of 
Resorts stock.1 In 1988, Griffco Acquisition Corporation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Fred Lowenschuss was the original defendant in this case. He held a 
total of 105,900 shares of Resorts stock both as an individual and as 
trustee for the Fred Lowenschuss IRA, the Laurance Lowenschuss IRA, 
and the Fred Lowenschuss Associates Pension Plan (the holder of most 
of the shares in question). Before the November 1996 trial, Fred's son, 
Laurance Lowenschuss, became the trustee of the Pension Plan, and the 
Bankruptcy Court severed the claims against Fred Lowenschuss 
individually and as a trustee. Laurance Lowenschuss, the current 
trustee of the Pension Plan and of the Laurance Lowenschuss IRA, is 
litigating this appeal. For simplicity, we will refer to Appellees simply 
as 
"Lowenschuss." 
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(owned by Merv Griffin) purchased Resorts in a leveraged 
buyout for $36 per share. Resorts sent a proxy statement 
to all its shareholders that explained the terms of the 
merger and stated that the shareholders had the right to 
receive $36 per share or to seek appraisal rights in the 
Delaware courts. 
 
Ultimately, the merger was approved by the Delaware 
Chancery Court and consummated. Resorts then sent a 
"Notice of Merger of Griffco Acquisition Corp. With and Into 
Resorts International Inc.," and a "Transmittal Letter" to 
shareholders, explaining that they could either tender their 
shares and receive $36 per share or obtain an appraisal 
under section 262 of the Delaware Corporation Law. 
Lowenschuss sent Resorts a letter demanding an appraisal. 
 
He then filed an appraisal action in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania. One week later, Resorts petitioned for 
appraisal in Delaware Chancery Court, identifying 
Lowenschuss as a shareholder seeking appraisal. The 
federal District Court dismissed Lowenschuss's claim 
without prejudice, deferring to the proceedings in Delaware. 
See Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int'l, Inc., No. Civ.A.89-1071 
(E.D. Pa. June 29, 1989). 
 
The Delaware Chancery Court issued a "Notice of 
Entitlement to Appraisal," explaining that shareholders 
seeking appraisal must "deliver [their] stock . . . certificates 
to the Register in Chancery within sixty (60) days of this 
notice [or risk] dismissal of the appraisal proceedings as to 
[the] shares." In re Appraisal of Resorts International, Inc., 
No. Civ.A.10626 (Del. Ch. May 31, 1989). Lowenschuss 
never delivered his shares. Instead, he filed an amended 
complaint in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against 
Resorts and others, moving for reconsideration of his 
request for an appraisal of the shares under his control. 
The District Court dismissed this action without prejudice, 
again because of the Delaware Chancery Court proceedings. 
 
This dispute involves the next moves by Lowenschuss. 
First, he filed (again in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania) 
a "Petition Requiring Resorts . . . to Pay $36.00 Merger 
Price to Plaintiffs Immediately for 105,900 Shares of 
Resorts Class A Stock Owned by Plaintiffs and Which Are 
 
                                3 
  
Hereby Being Tendered and to Complete the Record." In the 
Petition, he stated: "Plaintiffs are hereby tendering all of 
their Resorts International, Inc. Class A shares totaling One 
hundred and Five thousand Nine hundred (105,900) shares 
for immediate payment of the merger price of Thirty-six 
Dollars ($36.00) per share plus the interest which plaintiffs 
may be entitled to." 
 
Then, four days later, Lowenschuss tendered his shares, 
which were clearly marked as his, to Merrill Lynch, his 
broker, who in turn tendered them to Chase Manhattan 
Bank, Resort's Transfer Agent for the merger. As it regularly 
did, Chase forwarded a list of the tendering shareholders to 
Resorts and asked Resorts to wire funds to the payment 
account. Approximately two weeks after the tender, Resort's 
treasurer authorized the transfer of funds to Chase. Chase 
then delivered a check to Merrill Lynch for $3,805,200.00, 
which was paid over to Lowenschuss. Subsequently, the 
District Court denied Lowenschuss's Petition. See 
Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int'l, Inc., No. Civ.A.89-1071 (E.D. 
Pa. Aug. 3, 1989). 
 
When Resorts realized that it had paid Lowenschuss the 
merger price, it filed this suit seeking to recover the 
payment. Following the initiation of Resort's Chapter 11 
reorganization in New Jersey, this case was removed from 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to the Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of New Jersey. Resorts sought 
restitution of the transferred funds, claiming that the 
payment was (1) the result of a mistake by a Resorts 
employee, (2) a product of fraud, (3) contrary to Delaware 
corporate law, and (4) an avoidable transfer by a bankrupt 
entity under federal and New Jersey law. The Bankruptcy 
Court awarded Resorts full restitution on the alternative 
grounds of mistake and fraud, and appeared also to rely on 
the doctrine of illegal contracts and in pari delicto. See In re: 
Resorts International, Nos. 89-10119; 89-10120; 89-10461; 
89-10462; Adv. No. 90-1005 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 22, 1997) 
(slip opinion, hereinafter "Resorts I"). 
 
On appeal, the District Court reversed the Bankruptcy 
Court's ruling, concluding, inter alia, that there was no 
mistake of fact and that Resorts did not reasonably rely 
upon any misrepresentation. See In re: Resorts Int'l, Inc., 
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No. Civ.A.97-4710 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 1998) (unpublished 
letter opinion, hereinafter "Resorts II"). Resorts now appeals 
the District Court's decision, alleging that the court erred 
by overturning the Bankruptcy Court's holdings that: (1) 
Lowenschuss committed fraud; (2) Resorts made a mistake 
of fact; and (3) an illegal contract existed and the parties 
were not in pari delicto. Resorts also reasserts that the 
transaction is avoidable as a fraudulent conveyance under 
federal and state law. Finally, Lowenschuss contends that 
the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction. 
 
We exercise plenary review over the decision of a district 
court sitting as an appellate court in a bankruptcy 
proceeding. See In re Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc ., 16 F.3d 
552, 559 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc). As a result, our review 
is essentially a direct review of the ruling of the Bankruptcy 
Court. See Allegheny Int'l Inc. v. Snyder (In re Allegheny Int'l 
Inc.), 954 F.2d 167, 172 (3d Cir. 1992). We review the 
Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact for clear error and its 
conclusions of law de novo. See In re Sharon Steel Corp., 
871 F.2d 1217, 1222-23 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
II. 
 
Resorts now asserts that it should have prevailed at trial 
on three common law theories -- fraud, mistake, and illegal 
contract. 
 
A. Fraud 
 
The Bankruptcy Court concluded that Lowenschuss 
defrauded Resorts of the payment for his shares. To 
establish a prima facie case for fraud under New Jersey law,2 
Resorts was required to prove: (1) that Lowenschuss made 
a material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past 
fact, (2) which he knew or believed to be false, (3) upon 
which he intended Resorts to rely, (4) and upon which 
Resorts reasonably did rely, (5) with resulting damages. See 
Jewish Ctr. v. Whale, 432 A.2d 521, 524 (N.J. 1981). 
Moreover, it had to prove each element by clear and 
convincing evidence. See Stochastic Decisions, Inc. v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The parties agree that New Jersey law governs this issue. 
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DiDomenico, 565 A.2d 1133, 1137 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 
1989). 
 
We review the trial court's factual findings related to the 
fraud claim for clear error, keeping in mind the heightened 
"clear and convincing" standard. See, e.g. , United States v. 
Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1411 (3d Cir. 1994) (some 
"speculation [might] survive[ ] scrutiny under the 
preponderance of the evidence standard, [but] it certainly 
cannot withstand scrutiny under the clear and convincing 
evidence standard"); see also E.E.O.C. v. Local 638, 81 F.3d 
1162, 1174 (2d Cir. 1996) (the clearly erroneous standard 
of review is more stringent when applied to a trial court's 
finding that had to meet the "clear and convincing" 
standard). 
 
The District Court reversed the Bankruptcy Court, 
holding that it had misconstrued the significance of the 
various legal filings in question in finding a material 
misrepresentation, the facts did not support a finding of 
reliance, and, even if Resorts did rely on a 
misrepresentation, reliance was not reasonable. We agree 
because the evidence simply does not provide "clear and 
convincing" proof of reasonable reliance.3 
 
A finding of reliance is subject to review for clear error, 
see, e.g., Hong Kong Deposit & Guar. Co. v. Shaheen, 111 
B.R. 48, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), and a trial court may infer 
reliance from the various facts and circumstances of a case. 
See Knop v. McMahan, 872 F.2d 1132, 1142 (3d Cir. 1989). 
Again, this element required proof by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court considered the testimony of 
Resorts' former General Counsel, who stated that he 
understood at the time of Lowenschuss's tender that 
Lowenschuss had declined the merger price and was 
seeking a remedy in court. The General Counsel testified 
that it "[n]ever occurred to [him] that anyone would invoke 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Although we are not convinced that the District Court erred by holding 
that Lowenschuss's filings in this matter did not provide clear and 
convincing evidence of material misrepresentations, we need not resolve 
the issue because reasonable reliance was clearly lacking. 
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the appraisal rights and seek to be paid." Based solely upon 
this testimony, the Bankruptcy Court held that:"Resorts 
reliance was both reasonable and justifiable given the 
Trustee's numerous misrepresentations . . . that he was 
seeking a judicial remedy." Resorts I, at 49. 
 
Although Lowenschuss may have sought judicial relief to 
receive the original merger price, this could not signify to 
Resorts that he would not also tender his shares to the 
company. Because Lowenschuss was seeking to be allowed 
to tender his shares for payment of the merger price, it was 
certainly plausible that he would attempt to perform any 
necessary acts on his part, including tendering his shares. 
 
Courts often impose a stricter standard of reasonable 
reliance on sophisticated business persons. See Vanguard 
Telecomm., Inc. v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 900 F.2d 
645, 655 (3d Cir. 1990). Even absent a stricter standard, 
however, Resorts' actions reveal no reliance whatsoever 
because they demonstrate that Resorts established a 
system that would blindly pay all shareholders, even those 
who had sought an appraisal. Thus, Lowenschuss could 
have tendered his shares and been paid even if he never 
filed either of the claims to which the Bankruptcy Court 
referred. 
 
The District Court considered the Bankruptcy Court's 
finding that Resorts "failed to exercise reasonable care" 
when it authorized payment to Lowenschuss, Resorts II, at 
19-22 (quoting Resorts I, at 33), to determine that any 
reliance by Resorts was not reasonable. In particular, the 
Bankruptcy Court found that 
 
       Resorts failed to exercise reasonable care when it 
       authorized payment to Lowenschuss . . . . Resorts 
       breached its duty to adequately supervise the 
       surrender of shares . . . by failing to make even a 
       cursory investigation as to the identity of the tendering 
       shareholder and whether that shareholder had 
       previously sought appraisal rights. 
 
        The record further demonstrates that Chase 
       identified the [Lowenschuss] Pension Plan and I.R.A. as 
       tendering shareholders in a transfer journal sheet 
       dated July 26, 1989, some five days before the date 
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       Resorts authorized payment for the shares. Resorts 
       failed to provide a list of appraisal shareholders to the 
       employees responsible for payment upon surrender of 
       the shares, nor did Resorts provide such a list to 
       Chase. Even after learning of the illegal payment to 
       Lowenschuss, Resorts failed to issue corrected 
       instructions to Chase to cease all payments to 
       appraisal shareholders who failed to obtain the 
       requisite approvals . . . . Resorts paid other appraisal 
       shareholders, even after Resorts' counsel notified 
       Lowenschuss of his intent to recover the funds paid to 
       Lowenschuss. 
 
Resorts I, at 33-34. 
 
Knowing that Lowenschuss was seeking to be paid the 
merger price, Resorts should have, at the very least, 
reviewed the lists of tendering shareholders or contacted 
the court to determine whether it had custody of the 
shares. Nevertheless, Resorts did nothing. As a result, there 
simply was no reliance, reasonable or otherwise, by 
Resorts. The fraud claim, therefore, was properly rejected 
by the District Court.4 
 
B. Mistake 
 
Resorts next asserts that the District Court erred by 
reversing the Bankruptcy Court's ruling that Resorts made 
a mistake of fact. The Bankruptcy Court discussed Resorts' 
assertions that it was mistaken as to both fact and law; the 
former from its failure to recognize that it was Lowenschuss 
tendering the shares, and the latter from its belief that it 
was legally bound to pay Lowenschuss when he tendered. 
See Resorts I, at 25-28. Although the court then apparently 
concluded that Resorts had made a mistake of fact, its 
discussion of the issue relates to the alleged legal mistake. 
The Bankruptcy Court stated: 
 
        Here the Court finds that Resorts made a mistake of 
       fact. Resorts' employees including its former treasurer, 
       Thomas O'Donnell, and its Chief Financial Officer, 
       Matthew B. Kearney mistakenly believed that Resorts 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Because we hold that there was not sufficient evidence of reasonable 
reliance, we need not address the remaining elements of the fraud claim. 
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       was obligated to pay $36.00 for all Resorts shares 
       tendered. 
 
Id. at 28. Later, the Bankruptcy Court appeared to grant 
Resorts relief for its mistake: "[Lowenschuss] committed 
several wrongs apart from the illegality of the transaction. 
Accordingly, as this Court finds that Resorts made the 
payment as the result of a mistake, Resorts is entitled to 
restitution." Id. at 43. The court's analysis of this claim, 
however, included a discussion of the doctrine of illegal 
contract and in pari delicto. See Part II.C, infra. 
 
The District Court noted, and Resorts concedes, that if 
Resorts made the payment under the misapprehension that 
it was legally required to, Resorts made a classic mistake of 
law. Not surprisingly, Resorts now reasserts that it made 
both a mistake of law and a mistake of fact and that it 
should prevail under either theory. 
 
1. Mistake of Law 
 
Notwithstanding the Bankruptcy Court's finding, Resorts' 
first assertion on appeal is that it made a unilateral 
mistake of law "based on the erroneous belief that the 
company was required to accept the tender of shares that 
were subject to an appraisal proceeding." Appellants' Br. at 
38. However, it is a 
 
       settled principle of [New Jersey] law that where an 
       individual under a mistake of law, but with full 
       knowledge of the facts, voluntarily pays money on a 
       demand not legally enforceable against him, he cannot 
       recover it in the absence of unjust enrichment, fraud, 
       duress or improper conduct on the part of the payee. 
 
Messner v. County of Union, 167 A.2d 897, 898 (N.J. 1961). 
Resorts contends that it may recover under this theory 
because the Bankruptcy Court found sufficient"improper 
conduct" on Lowenschuss's part to allow for recovery. 
 
We reject this contention because Resorts' action did not 
result from ignorance or a mistake of law. Resorts' full 
knowledge of the law is evidenced by its response to 
Lowenschuss's Petition. In the response, filed over a week 
before Resorts authorized the payment for Lowenschuss's 
shares, the company argued that the request for payment 
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was "contrary to the controlling Delaware statute." Far from 
being mistaken as to any relevant law, Resorts was simply 
careless in entering into this contract by paying 
Lowenschuss for his shares when it may not have been 
obligated to. 
 
2. Mistake of fact 
 
For similar reasons, Resorts cannot recover by 
contending that it was operating under a mistake of fact as 
to the identity of the tenderer (Lowenschuss). Wefirst note 
that a "unilateral mistake of a fact unknown to the other 
party is not ordinarily grounds for avoidance of a contract," 
and that, in order to grant rescission in the case of a 
factual mistake, "the mistake must have occurred 
notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable care by the 
party making the mistake." Intertech v. City of Paterson, 
604 A.2d 628, 632 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992). 
 
The Bankruptcy Court and District Court both found that 
Resorts failed to act with reasonable care. We agree. 
Resorts' ignorance was self-imposed. It could easily have 
determined that Lowenschuss was tendering the shares 
because a list of tendering shareholders with his name on 
it was forwarded to Resorts before it authorized the 
payments. Nevertheless, the company chose not to review 
the list. As a result, Resorts' failure to realize that 
Lowenschuss had tendered his shares was of its own doing, 
and it cannot recover under this theory. 
 
C. Illegal contract 
 
As noted, the Bankruptcy Court interwove its discussion 
of mistake with a discussion of illegal contract and the 
doctrine of in pari delicto. In addition to the mistake 
analysis, the court appeared to find for Resorts under the 
illegal contract doctrine, holding that it deserved restitution 
because it was not in pari delicto with Lowenschuss. 
 
The doctrine of in pari delicto normally applies as a 
common law defense against a party seeking to enforce an 
illegal contract. "In pari delicto potior est conditio 
defendentis" means that "[i]n a case of equal or mutual 
fault . . . the position of the [defending] party . . . is the 
better one." Black's Law Dictionary 791 (6th ed. 1990). 
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Here, Resorts seeks to use the doctrine to gain restitution 
for its payment to Lowenschuss. 
 
Resorts' argument runs counter to New Jersey's law, that 
courts will leave the parties to an executed illegal contract 
as they are. See, e.g., Marx v. Jaffe, 222 A.2d 519, 521 
(N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1966); Paley v. Barton Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 196 A.2d 682, 685 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964). 
Courts on occasion, however, apply an equitable exception 
to this general rule when the parties are not in pari delicto. 
See, e.g., Singleton v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962, 969 (5th Cir. 
1970) (recognizing such an exception in Florida law). New 
Jersey courts give "a traditional construction to the 
defense," McAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d 
750, 757 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Pendleton v. Gondolf, 96 A. 
47 (N.J. Ch. Ct. 1915)), and have found a party to an illegal 
agreement deserving of equitable relief because he was not 
in pari delicto with the other party to the agreement. See 
Appel v. Reiner, 195 A.2d 310, 317-18 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. 
Div. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 204 A.2d 146 (N.J. 
1964). The Bankruptcy Court treated the doctrine as part of 
New Jersey law and applied it here. 
 
In its pre-trial ruling on the cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the Bankruptcy Court held that the transaction 
by which Lowenschuss tendered his shares and Resorts 
paid him for them constituted an illegal contract because 
the tender of the shares was contrary to Delaware 
Corporation Law S 262.5 The court held open the possibility 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Section 262 sets forth the rights and obligations of shareholders 
seeking an appraisal in lieu of payment for their shares following a 
merger. Lowenschuss voted against the merger and timely requested an 
appraisal, thereby securing the right to an appraisal. See Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 8, S 262(d). Subsection (e) allows the withdrawal of an appraisal 
demand and acceptance of the merger terms "at any time within 60 days 
after the effective date of the merger." Id., S 262(e). Lowenschuss, 
however, did not withdraw his request for appraisal within 60 days of 
the merger. 
 
The statute also provides for withdrawals that occur more than sixty 
days after the merger: 
 
       (k) From and after the effective date of the merger or 
consolidation, 
       no stockholder who has demanded his appraisal rights as provided 
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that it might later find that the parties were not in pari 
delicto, and award Resorts the equitable remedy of 
restitution on this basis. 
 
Following trial, the court found that Lowenschuss's 
misrepresentations, apart from the illegal transaction, 
prevented him from being in pari delicto with Resorts and 
ordered restitution in the amount of the transaction on this 
basis. See Resorts I, at 37-43. If the relative guilt of the 
parties is a primarily factual determination, then a trial 
court's finding of such is reviewed for clear error. See 
Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 808 F.2d 252, 260 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(Seitz, J., concurring). 
 
The Bankruptcy Court, however, was construing 
Lowenschuss's legal maneuvers to conclude that 
Lowenschuss was not in pari delicto with Resorts. The court 
noted: (1) that Lowenschuss tendered the shares knowing 
that they were subject to the appraisal action in Delaware; 
and (2) that after he tendered his shares, Lowenschuss 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       in subsection (d) of this section shall be entitled to vote such 
stock 
       for any purpose or to receive payment of dividends or other 
       distributions on the stock . . . ; provided, however, that . . . if 
such 
       stockholder shall deliver to the surviving or resulting corporation 
a 
       written withdrawal of his demand for an appraisal and an 
       acceptance of the merger or consolidation, either within 60 days 
       after the effective date of the merger . . . as provided in 
subsection 
       (e) of this section or thereafter with the written approval of the 
       corporation, then the right of such stockholder to an appraisal 
shall 
       cease. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no appraisal proceeding in 
the 
       Court of Chancery shall be dismissed as to any stockholder without 
       the approval of the Court, and such approval may be conditioned 
       upon such terms as the Court deems just. 
 
Id., S 262(e), (k) (emphasis added). Thus, section 262 requires a 
shareholder who has sought appraisal to get the corporation's written 
approval and the court's approval in order to withdraw his demand for 
appraisal more than 60 days after the date of the merger. The merger 
closed on November 15, 1988, and Lowenschuss did not tender his 
shares until July 17, 1989. Lowenschuss did not obtain Resorts' written 
approval of his withdrawal demand before tendering his shares. 
Therefore, his tender was contrary to the statute and, at least arguably, 
created an illegal contract. 
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failed to notify Resorts or the Pennsylvania District Court of 
the tender. See Resorts I, at 40-41. Although Lowenschuss 
may well have known that his tender was questionable, we 
agree with the District Court's conclusion that he was not 
more responsible for the mistaken payment than Resorts. 
 
Resorts' Notice of Merger and Letter of Transmittal 
indicated that it would pay the merger price to shareholders 
who had previously requested appraisal. Although the 
Bankruptcy Court did not credit Lowenschuss's testimony 
that he relied on the Letter of Transmittal in tendering his 
shares, see Resorts I, at 37, the notice indicates that 
Resorts, like Lowenschuss, was acting inconsistently with 
section 262. In sum, Lowenschuss and Resorts were both 
to blame for the resulting transaction and were in pari 
delicto. The District Court correctly rejected this doctrine as 
a basis for recovery. 
 
III. 
 
Resorts next asserts that the transaction is avoidable as 
a fraudulent conveyance under 11 U.S.C. S 548(a)(1)(B).6 
 
A. Section 548(a)(1)(B) avoidable transfers 
 
Section 548(a)(1)(B) allows bankruptcy debtors to avoid 
some transactions completed before the bankruptcyfiling. 
It states: 
 
       The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the 
       debtor in property . . . that was made or incurred on 
       or within one year before the date of the filing of the 
       petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily. . . 
       received less than a reasonably equivalent value in 
       exchange for such transfer or obligation; and . . . was 
       insolvent on the date that such transfer was made. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The briefs refer to 11 U.S.C. S 548(a)(2); however, under the current 
code, the relevant section is 548(a)(1)(B). Section 548 was amended in 
1998, and subsection 548(a)(2) now refers to transfers of charitable 
contributions. 
 
Resorts also asserted a similar claim under N.J. Stat. Ann. SS 25:2- 
25(b)(1) and 25:2-27(a). It now states, and we accept, that the analysis 
of the federal and state laws is practically identical, and therefore 
separate analysis of the state claim is not necessary. 
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11 U.S.C. S 548(a)(1)(B). It is not disputed that the 
transaction took place less than a year before Resorts' 
bankruptcy filing. Thus, if Resorts received less than a 
reasonably equivalent value to the $3,800,000 it paid and 
was insolvent on the date of the transfer to Lowenschuss, 
then section 548 would allow the trustee to avoid the 
transfer.7 
 
B. The section 546(e) exception 
 
Section 546(e) provides an exception to the rule of section 
548(a)(1)(B), preventing its operation when the payment in 
question was a securities "settlement payment." Section 
546(e) states: 
 
       Notwithstanding section[ ] . . . 548(a)(1)(B) . . . of this 
       title, the trustee may not avoid a transfer that is a . . . 
       settlement payment, as defined in section 101 or 741 
       of this title, made by or to a commodity broker, forward 
       contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, 
       or securities clearing agency, that is made before the 
       commencement of the case . . . . 
 
Id. S 546(e).8 
 
The issue is whether the Bankruptcy Court erred by 
holding that Resorts' payment to Lowenschuss was a 
"settlement payment," and that section 546, therefore, 
barred the application of section 548(a)(1)(B). Section 741 
defines "settlement payment" as "a preliminary settlement 
payment, a partial settlement payment, an interim 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Bankruptcy Court recited evidence that Resorts was insolvent 
when it paid Lowenschuss (including the fact that prior to making the 
payment, Lowenschuss had encouraged a group of Resorts shareholders 
to put the company into bankruptcy). See Resorts I, at 18-22. The court 
did not, however, make factual findings on this issue or the issue of 
reasonably equivalent value. Instead, the court assumed the existence of 
these elements and applied section 546(e) of the code. Because we 
determine that section 546(e) controls the outcome here, we need not 
address these factors. 
 
8. The exception does not apply to transfers that are avoidable under 
section 548(a)(1)(A), which requires, inter alia, a showing that a 
transfer 
was made with the intent to defraud creditors. That is clearly not the 
case here. 
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settlement payment, a settlement payment on account, a 
final settlement payment, or any other similar payment 
commonly used in the securities trade." Id. S 741(8) 
(emphasis added). Section 101 provides a similar definition, 
but limits it to payments used in the forward contracts 
trade. See id. S 101(51A). 
 
In Bevill, Bresler & Shulman Asset Management Corp. v. 
Spencer Savings & Loan Ass'n, 878 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1989), 
we addressed the meaning of "settlement payment" under 
section 546(f) in a securities transfer under "repo" 
agreements. Section 546(f) is similar to section 546(e) 
except that it applies specifically to settlement payments 
made "by or to a repo participant in connection with a 
repurchase agreement." 11 U.S.C. S 546(f). In Bevill, we 
noted that section 546 is at the intersection of"two 
important national legislative policies . . . on a collision 
course" -- the policies of bankruptcy and securities law. 
878 F.2d at 751. We stated that the "extremely broad," id., 
statutory definition of "settlement payment" is consistent 
with Congress's intent: 
 
       that a "settlement payment" may be the deposit of cash 
       by the purchaser or the deposit or transfer of the 
       securities by the dealer, and that it includes transfers 
       which are normally regarded as part of the settlement 
       process, whether they occur on the trade date, the 
       scheduled settlement day, or any other date in the 
       settlement process for the particular type of 
       transaction at hand. 
 
Id. at 752. Our prior recognition that the definition is 
extremely broad indicates that it is likely to encompass the 
instant transaction. Bevill, however, did not consider 
payments made pursuant to a leveraged buyout ("LBO"), 
and therefore does not definitively determine the outcome 
here. 
 
We begin every statutory interpretation by looking to the 
plain language of the statute. See Idahoan Fresh v. 
Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1998). 
When the language is clear, no further inquiry is necessary 
unless applying the plain language leads to an absurd 
result. See id. 
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In the securities industry, a settlement payment is 
generally the transfer of cash or securities made to 
complete a securities transaction. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846, 849 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(citing various securities industry texts). Here, the 
securities passed from Lowenschuss's broker, Merrill 
Lynch, to the transfer bank, Chase Manhattan. Resorts 
wired funds to Chase which Chase then forwarded them to 
Merrill Lynch who paid Lowenschuss. Although no clearing 
agency was involved in this transfer, two financial 
institutions -- Merrill Lynch and Chase -- were. Under a 
literal reading of section 546, therefore, this was a 
settlement payment "made by . . . a financial institution." 
11 U.S.C. S 546(e). 
 
A number of district courts have held that the term 
"settlement payment" does not include payments made for 
shares by a corporation as part of an LBO. See, e.g., Zahn 
v. Yucaipa Capital Fund, 218 B.R. 656, 675 (D.R.I. 1998); 
Wiebolt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 131 B.R. 655, 664-65 
(N.D. Ill. 1991). The reasoning of these courts is essentially 
that "the system of intermediaries and guarantees" that 
normal securities transactions involve is not in play in an 
LBO. See Zahn, 218 B.R. at 676. 
 
The only other court of appeals to directly address this 
question, however, followed a Bevill analysis and held that 
payments to shareholders as part of an LBO were 
"settlement payments" under the statute. See Kaiser Steel 
Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 952 F.2d 1230, 1239-40 (10th 
Cir. 1991);9 see also In re Comark, 971 F.2d 322, 325 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (citing Kaiser approvingly for the proposition that 
"a settlement is `the completion of a securities 
transaction' "). The general thrust of Kaiser Steel, Bevill and 
In re Comark is that the term "settlement payment" is a 
broad one that includes almost all securities transactions. 
Including payments made during LBOs within the scope of 
the definition is consistent with the broad meaning these 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Resorts argues that Kaiser Steel is inapposite because the 
transactions therein involved a clearing agency; however, some of the 
transactions also were made through a financial institution. See Kaiser 
Steel, 952 F.2d at 1240. 
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cases discern. A payment for shares during an LBO is 
obviously a common securities transaction, and we 
therefore hold that it is also a settlement payment for the 
purposes of section 546(e).10 
 
Resorts alternatively encourages us to follow Munford v. 
Valuation Research Corp., 98 F.3d 604, 610 (11th Cir. 
1996), in which the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
considered the application of section 546 to similar 
payments made to shareholders in an LBO. The two judges 
in the majority found it unnecessary to determine whether 
the payments were settlement payments under section 546, 
holding that even if they were, 
 
       section 546(e) is not applicable unless the transfer (or 
       settlement payment) was "made by or to a commodity 
       broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, 
       financial institution, or securities clearing agency." 11 
       U.S.C. S 546(e). . . . 
 
        True, a section 546(e) financial institution was 
       presumptively involved in this transaction. But the 
       bank here was nothing more than an intermediary or 
       conduit. Funds were deposited with the bank and when 
       the bank received the shares from the selling 
       shareholders, it sent funds to them in exchange. The 
       bank never acquired a beneficial interest in either the 
       funds or the shares. 
 
Munford, 98 F.3d at 610 (emphasis added). 
 
The court went on to hold that trustees may only avoid 
transfers to a "transferee," and that the bank was not such 
a transferee because it never acquired a beneficial interest 
in the funds. See id. (citing In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 
848 F.2d 1196, 1200 (11th Cir. 1988)). It concluded that 
"the shareholders were the only `transferees' of the funds 
[and that] section 546(e) offers no protection from the 
trustee's avoiding powers to shareholders; rather, section 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Despite this logical conclusion, a number of commentators have 
criticized Kaiser Steel for applying section 546 to a transaction that did 
not implicate the concerns that Congress had in creating the law. See, 
e.g., Frank R. Kennedy & Gerald K. Smith, Fraudulent Transfers and 
Obligations: Issues of Current Interest, 43 S.C. L. Rev. 709 (1992). 
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546(e) protects only commodity brokers, forward contract 
merchants, stockbrokers, financial institutions, and 
securities clearing agencies." Id. The court therefore held 
section 546(e) inapplicable because the transaction did not 
involve a transfer to "one of the listed protected entities." Id. 
 
We, however, are more persuaded by the dissent which 
relied, as we do, on the plain language of the statute. See 
id. at 613 (Hatchett, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). Section 546(e) protects from trustee's avoidance 
powers settlement payments made "by . . . a financial 
institution." The majority in Munford seems to have read 
into section 546(e) the requirement that the "commodity 
brokers, forward contract merchants, stockbrokers, 
financial institutions, and securities clearing agencies" 
obtain a "beneficial interest" in the funds they handle for 
the section to be applicable. This requirement is not explicit 
in section 546.11 
 
Despite the fact that payments to shareholders in an LBO 
are not the most common securities transaction, we see no 
absurd result from the application of the statute's plain 
language and will not disregard it. We hold, therefore, that 
section 546 applies to the transaction and prevents its 
avoidance under section 548(a)(1)(B).12  
 
IV. 
 
We conclude that Resorts does not deserve restitution 
under the state law claims; that Resorts may not avoid the 
transfer of funds to Lowenschuss by way of the bankruptcy 
statute; and that jurisdiction was proper in the Bankruptcy 
Court. We will affirm. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Nor does it logically follow from the application of section 550, 
which 
allows trustees to recover property that was the subject of an avoided 
transfer from the transferee, see 11 U.S.C.S 550, as the Munford 
majority seemed to indicate. See Munford, 98 F.3d at 610. 
 
12. Lowenschuss contends that the Pension Plan was improperly added 
as a party and that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction because 
the removal to the Bankruptcy Court from the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania was invalid. We decline to discuss these 
claims, noting instead that they are without merit. 
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